We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player: i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand coalition stable.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a two-step distributed allocation process where, at every time, the players first adjust their average allocation vectors based on the inputs received from their neighbor players and second generate a new utility and allocate it. The time-averaged allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging dynamics. The goal is to let all allocations reach consensus to any value in a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances.
Motivations: The problem arises in the context of dynamic coalitional games with Transferable Utilities (TU games) [1] . A coalitional TU game consists in a set of players, who can form coalitions, and a characteristic function that provides a value for each coalition. The predefined set introduced above can be thought of as (but it is not limited to) the core of the game. This is the set of imputations under which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its players' payoffs. By payoff we mean the share allocated to the player. Therefore, no coalition has incentives to leave the grand coalition and receive a larger payoff.
Highlights of Contributions: We analyze conditions under which the average allocations: i) approach a given target set (Theorem 1), ii) reach consensus, in which case we also compute the consensus value (Theorem 2), and iii) are robust against disturbances (Theorem 3). Validation of such conditions implies the solution of a quadratic Manuscript program (projection on a convex set) and a feasibility linear program (find at least a feasible solution of a set of inequalities). Related Literature: TU games were first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [2] . Here, a main issue is to study whether the core is an "approachable" set, and which allocation processes can lead to stable payoff allocations in that set. Approachability theory was developed by Blackwell in 1956 [3] , and is captured in the well-known Blackwell's Theorem. The geometric (approachability) principle upon which the Blackwell's Theorem is built, is used in several application domains such as allocation processes [4, Section 3.2], regret minimization [5, Eq. C.1], and machine learning (see [6, Section 2] ).
The discrete-time dynamics considered in this paper involves a distributed averaging process (see, e.g., [7] and references therein) and this is an element in common with distributed multi-agent optimization [7] - [12] .
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the problem and discuss motivations and assumptions. In Section III, we illustrate the main results. In Section IV, we provide a numerical study. Finally, in Section V, we provide concluding remarks and future directions.
Notation:
We let x denote the transpose of a vector x, and x denote its Euclidean norm. An n × n matrix A is row-stochastic if the matrix has nonnegative entries a i j and n j=1 a i j = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For a matrix A, we use a i j to denote its ijth entry. A matrix A is doubly stochastic if both A and its transpose A are row-stochastic. We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S. We write P X [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on a set X, and we write dist(x, X) for the distance from x to X, i.e., P X [x] = arg min y∈X x − y and dist(x, X) = x − P X [x] , respectively. Given a function of time x(·) : N → R, we denote byx(t) its average up to time t, i.e.,x(t) :
II. DISTRIBUTED UTILITY ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
Every player in a set N = {1, . . . , n} proposes a distribution of the utilities which is given by the average allocation vectorx i (t + 1) ∈ R n . The jth component ofx i (t + 1) defines the share that player i would allocate to player j on average up to time t + 1. At every time, each player first adjusts its average allocation vector based on the inputs received from its neighbor players and then generates a new allocation vector x i (t + 1).
Let a communication graph G(t) = (N, E(t)) be given. A link (j, i) ∈ E(t) exists if player j is a neighbor of player i at time t. Each player adjusts its average allocation vector so that the new current average allocation, we call it space average and denote it by w i (t), is in the convex hull of its neighbors' average allocations, i.e., where a i = (a i 1 , . . . , a i n ) is a vector of nonnegative weights consistent with the sparsity of G, i.e., a i j (t) = 0 if and only if (j, i) ∈ E(t). Thus, the time-averaged allocationx i (t) evolves according tô
Problem: Our goal is to study under what conditions the average allocation vectors converge to a unique value lying in a predefined target set X:
A. Main Assumptions
Following [7] (see also [1] ), we can make the following assumptions on the information structure. Let A(t) be the weight matrix with entries a i j (t). Assumption 1: Each matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic with positive diagonal. Furthermore, there exists a scalar α > 0 such that a i j (t) ≥ α whenever a i j (t) > 0. In addition to this, the union of the graphs G(t) over a period of time is assumed to be connected. Assumption 2: There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph (N,
It is worth noting that the joint strong connectivity is the weakest possible assumption to guarantee persistent circulation of the information through the graph.
The above assumptions imply that the weights of the communication graph are determined exogenously but accordingly to some predefined rules.
The following assumption characterizes the target set X. Assumption 3: The target set X is nonempty, convex and compact. Finally, the next assumption indicates how the new utility vector has to be generated in order to obtain approachability, i.e., convergence of the average allocations to the target set.
Assumption 4: For each i ∈ N the new utility vector is bounded, i.e., there exists L > 0 s.t. ∀t ≥ 0 x i (t + 1) ≤ L, and satisfies the following inequality:
From a geometric standpoint, Assumption 4 requires that, given the two half-spaces identified by the supporting hyperplane of X through P X [w i (t)], the new utility vector x i (t + 1) lies in the half-space not containing w i (t). A graphical illustration of the aforementioned condition is in Fig. 1 .
B. Motivating Example: Coalitional Game
The set X introduced above can be thought of as the core of a TU game. A coalitional TU game is defined by a pair N, η , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and η : 2 N → R a function defined for each coalition S ⊆ N (S ∈ 2 N ). The function η determines the value η(S) assigned to each coalition S ⊂ N , with η(∅) = 0. We let η S be the value η(S) of the characteristic function η associated with a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N . Given a TU game N, η , let C(η) be the core of the game
Essentially, the core of the game is the set of all allocations that make the grand coalition stable with respect to all subcoalitions. Condition j∈N [x] j = η N is also called efficiency condition. Condition j∈S [x] j ≥ η S for all nonempty S ⊂ N is referred to as "stability with respect to subcoalitions," since it guarantees that the total amount given to the members of a coalition exceeds the value of the coalition itself.
Consistently with Assumptions 3, a common assumption in TU games is that the core set is nonempty, convex and bounded, and the utilities generated at each time are bounded [3] , [13] . The core set is usually assumed to be known by the players. Whenever the core set is empty and not known by all the players, the grand coalition is not stable and the players tend to form sub-coalitions according to more or less complex bargaining processes. Coalition formation [14] is a separate and independent body of literature, which is far from the scope of this paper. Further, in approachability theory, given a twoplayer repeated game with vector payoffs, a condition similar to the ones stated in Assumptions 4 and 5, is used to prove that a given set is approachable by player 1, independently of the strategy used by player 2. Such condition have also been shown to be sufficient condition for the existence of attractors in nonlinear analysis and in the theory on differential inclusion (see also [15, Corollary 5.1] ). We borrow such a condition for design purposes. In other words we wish to design our distributed algorithm in order to let the players reach consensus. This is in accordance with the idea of mechanism design, where a central planner designs incentives for the player to cooperate.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Next, we provide the main results of the paper. Namely, we prove that the average allocations: i) approach the set X (Theorem 1), ii) reach consensus (Theorem 2), and iii) are robust against disturbances (Theorem 3). To improve the readability of the paper all the proofs are collected in Appendix section at the end of the paper.
A. Approachability and Consensus
Before stating the first theorem, we need to introduce two lemmas. The first lemma establishes that the space averaging step in (2) reduces the total distance (i.e., the sum of distances) of the average allocations from the set X.
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the total distance from X decreases when replacing the allocationsx i (t) by their space averages
Proof: See the Appendix for a proof. Observing that the distance of a point from a convex set is equal to the distance from its projection (which is by definition smaller than the distance from any other point in the set) and using (2) and (1), it holds
We are now ready to state the first main result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then all average allocations approach set X, i.e.,
Proof: See the Appendix for a proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive in the sense that it provides also a guideline on how to select the new iterate so that the conditions in Assumption 4 are satisfied. In particular, the new iterate is obtained by projecting the current point on the approachable set, by identyifing the supporting hyperplane and by selecting a point on the opposite half-space than the one containing the current point. All steps involve solving convex programs or linear inequalities.
Next, let us introduce the barycenter of the average allocations and the utility vectors, respectivelŷ
Consistently, let us denote byx b (t) the time average of the barycenter, i.e.,x
The following lemma establishes that the barycenter of the average allocations evolves as the time averagex b (t) of the barycenter of the utility vectors generated by the players.
Lemma 2: The barycenter of the local allocationsx b (t) coincides at each time t with the time-average of the barycenter of the generated utility vectorsx b (t).
Proof: See the Appendix for a proof. The following theorem establishes that all allocations converge tō x b (t), which in the limit must belong to X according to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: (Consensus to the barycenter time-average) Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, all players reach consensus on the timeaverage of the barycenter of the utility vectors generated by each player,x b (t), i.e., Proof: See the Appendix for a proof. Summarizing the two main results, we have proven that the players' allocations converge asymptotically to the time-average of the barycenter of the generated utility vectors and that this vector lies in the core of the game.
B. Adversarial Disturbance
Here, we analyze the case where, for each player i ∈ N , the input x i (·) is the payoff of a repeated two-player game between player i (Player i 1 ) and an (external) adversary (Player i 2 ). With some slight abuse of notation, we denote S 1 and S 2 the finite set of actions of players i 1 and i 2 respectively.
The instantaneous payoff x i (t) at time t is given by a function φ i : S 1 × S 2 → R n as follows:
where j(t) ∈ S 1 and k(t) ∈ S 2 . We extend x i to the set of mixed actions pairs, Δ(S 1 ) × Δ(S 2 ), in a bilinear fashion. In particular, for every pair of mixed strategies (p(t), q(t)) ∈ Δ(S 1 ) × Δ(S 2 ) for player i 1 and i 2 at time t, the expected payoff is
For simplicity the one-shot vector-payoff game (S 1 , S 2 , x i ) is denoted by G i .
Let λ ∈ R n . Denote by λ, G i the zero-sum one-shot game whose set of players and their action sets are as in the game G i , and the payoff that player 2 pays to player 1 is λ φ(j, k) for every (j, k) ∈ S 1 × S 2 .
The resulting zero-sum game is described by the matrix
As a zero-sum one-shot game, the game λ, G i has a value, denoted by v λ := min
For every mixed action p ∈ Δ(S 1 ), denote D 1 (p) the set of all payoffs that might be realized when player i 1 plays the mixed action p:
Let us adapt Assumption 4 to the worst-case setting introduced in this section.
Assumption 5: For any w i (t) ∈ R n , there exists a mixed strategy p(t + 1) ∈ Δ(S 1 ) for Player i 1 such that, for all mixed strategy q(t + 1) ∈ Δ(S 2 ) of Player i 2 , the new utility vector is bounded, i.e., there exists L > 0 s.t. ∀t ≥ 0 x i (t + 1) ≤ L, and satisfies
where Ex i (t + 1) = j∈S 1 k∈S 2 p j (t + 1)q k (t + 1)φ(j, k).
The above condition is among the foundations of approachability theory as it guarantees that the average payoff (1/T )
converges almost surely to X (see, e.g., [3] and also [13, Ch. 7] ). Here, we adapt the above condition to the multi-agent and distributed scenario under study.
Corollary III.1 (See [3, Corollary 2]):
Any convex set X ⊂ R n is approachable if and only if v λ < 0 for any λ ∈ R n .
Next we show that if the approachability condition expressed above holds true, then dist(x i , X) tends to zero for any X. We write w.p.1 to mean "with probability 1." Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 1-3 and 5 hold. Then all average allocations approach set X w.p.1, i.e.,
Proof: See the Appendix for a proof. We conclude this section by observing that Theorem 2 still holds and therefore all players' average allocations reach consensus on the time-average of the barycenter of the utility vectors generated by each player.
IV. SIMULATIONS
We illustrate the results in a game with four players, N = {1, . . . , 4}, communicating according to a fixed undirected cycle graph. That is,
=7 and η N = 10 (η S is the value of coalition S). 1 That is, each player expects to receive at least a utility of 2 which is its own value. But, for example, players 1 and 2 expect to be more valuable if they form a coalition as well as 3 and 4. Consistently, the core of the game is the polyhedral set given by
We initialize the assignments assuming that each player allocates to itself the entire utility. That is, denoting b i ∈ R n the i-th canonical vector (so that, e.g., b 1 = [1 0 . . . 0] ), we setx i (0) = 10 b i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At every iteration t ∈ N, each player chooses the new utility vector x i (t + 1) according to the approachability principle. In particular, we set x i (t + 1) = P X [w i (t)] + α(P X [w i (t)] − w i (t)) + v T , where α is a random number uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and v ⊥ a random vector belonging to the hyperplane orthogonal to the vector w i (t) − P X [w i (t)] with coordinates (with respect to the basis vectors) uniformly chosen in [0, 1]. The temporal evolution of the local average allocation vectors is depicted in Fig. 2 . As expected the local average allocations converge to the same average assignment which is the point of the core [2 3 2.5 2.5] .
V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed convergence conditions of a distributed allocation process arising in the context of TU games. Future directions include the extension of our results to population games with mean-field interactions, and averaging algorithms driven by Brownian motions.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: By convexity of the distance function dist(·, X) and from (1) we have dist (w i (t), X) ≤ n j=1 a i j (t)dist (x j (t), X) . 1 The values that are not specified are assumed to be irrelevant for the core definition. For example η {2,3} ≤ 4. Summing over i = 1, . . . , n both sides of the above inequality, we obtain
where the last equality follows from the stochasticity of A(t) in Assumption 1. This concludes the proof. Proof of Theorem 1: Recall from (3) that
From Lemma 1 and rearranging the above inequality, we have
where the last inequality is due to Assumption 4. The right hand side n i=1 x i (t + 1) − P X [w i (t)] 2 is bounded (from Assumption 3 and the boundedness of x i (t + 1)) by some M > 0. Summing over t = 0, . . . , τ − 1, and noting that
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove the statement observe thatx b (0) = x b (0) = x b (0). Thus, we prove thatx b (t) andx b (t) satisfy the same dynamics. By definition of time-average,x b (t) satisfies the dynamics
The dynamics ofx b (t) is
Exchanging the sum signŝ
and, by Assumption 1 (A(t) is doubly stochastic)
which is the same dynamics as (4), thus concluding the proof. Proof of Theorem 2: Using the previous lemma we can show that x i (t) converges tox b (t). Let us introduce the error of the average allocationx i (t) from the barycenter, i.e.,ê i (t) =x i (t) −x b (t). The error dynamics is given bŷ
a i jxb (t)
Thuŝ
Multiplying both sides by (t + 1) and taking t inside the sum (t + 1)ê i (t + 1) = n j=1 a i j (t)tê j (t) + e i (t + 1).
Definingẑ i (t) = tê i (t), we havê
In vector form the above equation turns to bê 
Thus, we can simply work on each component separately. With a slight abuse of notation, we neglect the subscript of [ẑ] and [e] , and writê z(t) and e(t).
It is worth noting that the driven system (6) , and so (5), is not bounded-input-bounded-state stable (when a general input signal is allowed). That is, for general initial condition and input signal the state trajectory may diverge. We show that for the special initial condition (ẑ(t) = 0 by construction) and class of input signals (1 e(t + 1) = 0 by definition) under consideration, the state trajectories of (5) are bounded.
First, let us observe that, multiplying both sides of (5) by the vector
Sinceẑ(0) = 0 by construction, it holds 1 ẑ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ N. That is,ẑ(t) is orthogonal to the vector 1 for all t.
Next, we show that the trajectoryẑ(·) is bounded. Following [16] , let P ∈ R (n−1)×n be a matrix defining an orthogonal projection on the space orthogonal to span {1}. It holds that P 1 = 0 and P x| 2 = x 2 if x 1 = 0. Thus, from equation (7) we have that Pẑ(t) 2 = ẑ(t) 2 for all t. Therefore, proving boundedness ofẑ(·) is equivalent to showing that Pẑ(·) is bounded. For a given P , associated to any A(t) satisfying Assumption 1, there existsĀ(t) satisfying P A(t) = A(t)P . Multiplying both sides of equation (5) by P , we get Pẑ(t + 1) = P A(t)ẑ(t) + P e(t + 1) =Ā(t)Pẑ(t) + P e(t + 1).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the undriven dynamics y(t + 1) = A(t)y(t) is uniformly exponentially stable, i.e., y(t) < Cρ t y(0) with C and ρ < 1 independent of y(0) aan depending only on n, Q and α (see [17, Theorem 9 .2 and Corollary 9.1]). Thus, the state trajectories of (8) are bounded for any bounded signal P e(t + 1) with 1 e(t) = 0.
Since 1 e(t) = 0 for all t, we have P e(t) 2 = e(t) 2 for all t, which is bounded. The proof follows from noting that Pẑ(t) 2 = ẑ(t) 2 and thatẑ(t) = tê(t). Proof of Theorem 3: From (3), invoking Lemma 1 and using Assumption 5, we have n i=1 (t + 1) 2 
Summing over t = 0, . . . , τ − 1, and noting that x i (t + 1) − P X [w i (t)] is upper bounded (from Assumption 3 and the boundedness of x i (t + 1)) by some M > 0, we obtain
where K i t = (1/τ )2t w i (t) − P X [w i (t)] . Now, using x i (t + 1) ≤ L ∀t ≥ 0 from Assumption 5 and from (2) and (1), we have that w i (t) is bounded which in turn implies that w i (t) − P X [w i (t)] is bounded. Then, the second term in the right-hand side is an average of bounded zero-mean martingale differences, and therefore the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality (together with the Borel-Cantelli lemma) immediately implies that 
